David I. Theodoropoulos, Las Sombras Biological
Preserve, Box 337, La Honda, CA 94020-0337 USA
(408) 236-3728
dt@dtheo.org
The following are my comments on Docket No. 03-069-1.
I believe that the USDA is seriously overreacting and overstepping with this proposal. While we all
wish to minimize the entry of new pests into the United States, we must recognize that the free flow
of a wide variety of plant materials is essential to our continued economic health and to national
security. The regular importation of seeds and propagative materials by individuals, plant
societies, botanic gardens, and commercial concerns creates a vast, decentralized network of
maintained ex situ biological diversity which may be drawn upon in the case of interrupted access by
uncooperative or unfriendly countries. This vast, decentralized network of maintained ex situ
biodiversity should be considered of great strategic importance to the United States, and therefore
should be encouraged and supported by government agencies as a means of maintaining our economic
health and our leadership in the world. We need look no further than the devastating strategic
consequences of the interruption of natural rubber supplies during WWII, or the interruption of
supplies of a scarce plant gum (Astragalus) important in key industries that occurred after the
revolution in Iran, to highlight the importance to national security of maintaining a widespread,
decentralized network of maintained ex situ biological diversity. Such free flow of living plant
materials is essential to our national security, and limiting such free flow will place the United
States at great risk.
We should take the decentralized information network of the internet as a model to emulate. The DNA
in the genetic make-up of living organisms has been likened to information, and the Earth's
biological diversity has been called a great library. If we look to the internet as a model for the
proper handling of information, no one would deny that there is on rare occasions harmful
information distributed through the internet. Yet most believe that the increased communication,
education, and greatly increased trade promoted by the internet has led to remarkable economic
benefits, as well as helping to promote the spread of freedom and democracy. If the Department
believes that the internet has made the world a safer and more productive place, then the Department
should help to create a similar model to promote the flow of biological "information" -
seeds and plants.
Yes, we all want to minimize movement of known pests, but have to accept that this will happen on
occasion, and new pests will evolve, in spite of our best efforts. In the interests of continued
economic health and security, a certain amount of risk must be accepted. For example, thousands of
people die or are injured each year in automobile accidents, or from adverse reactions from
prescription drugs, but we accept that the advantages to society from medicine and automobiles are
such that a certain amount of harm is acceptable.
Take a moment and imagine the economic losses if the internet had not been released to the public,
or if every web page or every e-mail had to undergo "risk assessment" before entering the
information-stream. Certainly there have been, among the millions sent or posted, e-mails or
websites of criminal intent, yet most recognize that these are an unavoidable and minor consequence
compared with the enormous benefits of a free, decentralized, and uncontrolled information network.
Then imagine for a moment the devastating economic losses that would occur if the internet were shut
down or severely limited. This is what the USDA is proposing to do to the nation's "biological
internet" - shutting down and severely limiting the existing, decentralized, free-flowing
network of ex situ biological diversity.
Imagine what would be the fate of the careers of any policy makers who attempted to place a similar
set of restrictions on the internet.
In the "Summary" the USDA states:
"Under the current regulations, all plants for planting are allowed to enter the United States
if they are accompanied by a phytosanitary certificate and if they are inspected and found to be
free of plant pests, unless their importation is specifically prohibited or further restricted by
the regulations."
This is completely adequate to provide a reasonable, high level of protection from imported pests
and weeds. In fact, the requirement of a phytosanitary certificate is already overkill for small
shipments not in media, and clean seeds - these are easily inspected on arrival - in fact I would
have more confidence in an "on arrival" inspection by competent USDA inspectors rather
than a phytosanitary certificate issued by possibly less well-trained foreign inspectors. In the
interests of promoting the beneficial free flow of living plant materials, and reaping the
considerable economic and strategic benefits that result from such free flow, this phytosanitary
requirement should be dropped, and we should return to the old system of "on arrival"
inspection, which worked well for many decades.
If the Department is being overwhelmed by the volume of imports, federal funding for inspections
should be increased as a matter of highest priority. The economic and strategic benefits of numerous
diverse small shipments entering the U.S. are too great to allow the under funding of the Department
in this regard to drive an attempt to decrease such shipments.
Under the section "Problems for the Regulations Posed by Recent Trends in the Importation of
Plants for Planting" the information provided clearly indicates that the increased risk comes
from the importation of large quantities of established material. Yet the intent of the proposed
changes indicates an intent to require risk assessment for those species currently being imported in
only small quantities, while those currently being imported in large ("significant")
quantities would be considered "presumed to be safe" - this is an alarming fault of logic.
Certainly, Pelargoniums (one of the most widely-grown ornamentals, and imported in
"significant" quantities) would have fallen into the "presumed to be safe"
category not requiring risk assessment, yet the incident of the Ralstonia-infected Pelargoniums is
presented as supporting the proposed changes. Nothing in the proposed changes would have prevented
the accidental importation of the Ralstonia-infected Pelargoniums.
Several of those who have already commented on this docket have mentioned this incident as
justification for support of the changes proposed in the docket, yet this incident is actually a
powerful argument against the proposed changes.
Sudden Oak Death was mentioned in a comment - again, if this pathogen did indeed originate from
imported stock (duly inspected and with phytosanitary certificate), nothing in the proposed changes
would have prevented its entry, and no risk assessment could possibly have predicted the outcome - a
symptomless microbe in one species having effects on another, unrelated species. In addition, normal
rapid microbial evolution will insure that new pathogens will arise even in the absence of any
movement of hosts. We must recognize that such unpredictable events will occur no matter what system
is in place.
One comment on the docket gave the example of illegal weedy aquatic plants being sold on the
internet as justification supporting the docket. Again, if these plants are already prohibited,
nothing in the proposed changes would affect the situation, and again, increased efficient
well-trained inspectors at ports of entry under the current regulations would be much more helpful.
The statement on page 71739:
"Develop a strategy of quarantine development tied to pest risk potential that is reasonable,
enforceable, and transparent"
is entirely at odds with the intent to:
"Consider adopting a modified "clean list" approach for propagative material,
specifying what is permissible subsequent to risk assessment, rather than the current "dirty
list" approach that prohibits or restricts specific articles only (recommendation E-46)"
because a "clean list" approach is entirely unreasonable, as is "risk
assessment" because of the unknown and unpredictable nature of the problem as outlined. The
importation of only stock free from possible pests that may be "rare, small in size, borne
within the plant, an asymptomatic plant pathogen, or not yet recognized and regulated as a
quarantine pest" is completely unenforceable, particularly considering "asymptomatic plant
pathogens." This is absurd in the extreme. It is impossible to prevent all risk from unknown,
unpredictable, and unforeseeable events.
Merely because a recommendation has been made at one time, based on faulty and inadequate
information, does not mean that the Department is mandated to adopt that recommendation, regardless
of the economic and strategic consequences - it is time for the Department to recognize and own up
to the fact that some of the recommendations it has received are unreasonable, unworkable,
unfounded, and inappropriate. Does the Department have no mechanism for discarding unworkable ideas,
or is the Department mechanistically locked into following every idea proposed, even if it leads
right over a cliff?
Under "Collecting Data on the Current Importation of Taxa of Plants for Planting" the
Department asks:
1. Are there any sources other than those listed above from which we should solicit or obtain data?
2. What should we do to ensure that the data we receive accurately reflect actual importations of
plants for planting?
3. What are the taxa or types of plants for planting for which obtaining accurate data might be
especially difficult?
None of this data is necessary - the Department should put its resources into well-trained
inspectors on the ground at ports of entry. The example noted above, of the Pelargonium which would
clearly have fallen into the category of a plant "already being imported in significant
amounts", should demonstrate that obtaining lists of species and the quantities being imported
will not protect us from pests. In fact, biological realities would indicate that those being
imported in small quantities are the least risk - these small quantities are the most easily
inspected, and the wide variety of species lessens the chances that they carry pests of concern
because of the genetic distance from major crops. Large-scale importations of commodities pose the
greatest risk to U.S. agriculture because of the difficulties of inspection, and the relatedness to
our own crops.
"Establishing a New Category for Certain Taxa of Plants for Planting That Would Be Excluded
From Importation Pending Risk Evaluation and Approval"
It is dangerously inappropriate to adopt a "guilty until proven innocent" policy towards
the biological diversity of the earth - our nation needs ready access to this biodiversity in order
to remain economically healthy and strategically safe. We need to increase the number of species
being maintained within our borders, not place roadblocks in front of the "biological
internet" that is safeguarding our nation's strategic access to biodiversity. Again, this is
entirely unnecessary, counterproductive, and would be an irresponsible misuse of the Department's
limited resources. If there is evidence of risk relating to a specific taxon, existing categories
suffice to restrict or prevent importation. There is no need to burden the Department with unneeded
tasks that will misdirect scarce resources into ineffective "busywork". The USDA must work
aggressively to streamline processes to deal with the ongoing and inevitable process of
globalization. The department must not hamstring itself by creating enormous new burdens for its
staff, particularly when there are even now not enough inspectors on the ground. The Department
should be aggressively pursuing the federal funds it needs to do the job it already has, in the way
that has proven effective over the decades - qualified inspectors on the ground.
The "first option" described is absolutely unworkable, and the Department makes it clear
that it does not have the resources to implement it, and further, the detailed knowledge of the
earth's biological diversity that would be required simply does not exist. If we applied the
Pentagon's budget to an examination of the earth's biodiversity, we might have the information
needed within a hundred years. The "first option" is absurd in the extreme.
The "second option" described, while less impossible and unworkable, is still
unacceptable. If evidence exists that an importation could cause harm, then existing categories and
regulations should be employed. It is dubious whether "the second option could be implemented
with the resources presently available", but in any case, the strategic and economic advantages
of the United States' continued free access to important biological resources are so great that we
cannot allow those resources to be excluded on slender evidence merely for the convenience of USDA
staff. This category should only be created with serious limitations - a species should only be
placed in this category on the presentation of compelling evidence, and only for a temporary period
to allow the department to conduct the usual "rule and comment" period, and to conduct a
risk assessment. Ninety days should be the absolute maximum allowed for a taxon to remain in this
category.
We invite responses to the following questions in particular on the
"excluded pending risk evaluation and approval" category we are
considering:
1. How would each of the two options for adding taxa of plants for
planting to this category affect the sectors of the horticultural
industry that propagate and sell imported plants for planting? Which
option would disrupt current trade in plants for planting the least?
It is inappropriate for the department to present only these two options - the third option is to
not establish the "Third Category" at all. The first option is clearly absurd, unworkable,
and destructive to the strategic and economic interests of the United States. It would be extremely
costly to the horticulture industry and highly disruptive to trade. The second option is merely
egregious and destructive to the strategic and economic interests of the United States. It, too,
will be extremely costly to the horticulture industry and disruptive to trade. Merely because the
second option is less harmful than the first option does not make it workable or desirable.
2. If the first option were implemented, what should constitute a
"significant" amount for taxa of plants for planting that are already
being imported?
The first option absolutely must not be implemented - this is simply not workable. There will be
far-reaching consequences if the first option is implemented, and could easily lead to a
congressional inquiry into the Department.
3. If the second option were implemented, what sources of
information and what minimum criteria should be used to determine
whether a specific taxon should be excluded pending risk evaluation and
approval?
The only acceptable sources should be peer-reviewed scientific literature. The minimum criterion
should be experimentally-demonstrated harm. The other sources, "government reports,
professional organizations, and international databases" are all notoriously unreliable, as
witness the various lists of "invasive species" and "weeds" which include
species on the basis of single anecdotal reports. These are unacceptable as a basis for formulating
public policy. Only experimentally-demonstrated harm, using fully operational terms, can be
accepted.
4. Should taxa of plants for planting imported from different
regions be considered separate regulated articles for the purposes of
this category? For example, if a taxon is currently being imported in
significant quantities from Africa but has never been imported from
Asia, should imports of this taxon from Asia be excluded pending risk evaluation and approval?
No. This portion of the proposal fails the test of reasonableness.
We invite responses to the following questions in particular on the
clean stock programs we are considering:
1. Is it feasible to use this type of program in producing large
volumes of taxa of plants for planting other than those that are
currently exported to the United States under the programs in our
regulations? What additional costs might be associated with growing
other taxa of plants for planting under this type of program? What
benefits might be associated with implementing such a program?
No, this is not feasible except for the largest growers. The costs associated with this would be
tremendous, and not commensurate with the advantages gained in reducing pest risk. Where will the
Department find the staff and resources to implement and monitor such a program? Where will growers
find the staff and resources to comply with the excessive record keeping proposed? Will this
constitute an interference with the "organic" sector which is prohibited from the
pesticide use that will be required? The Department fails to ask "what harm might be associated
with implementing such a program?" - serious economic and strategic harm would result from
limiting the United States' access to biodiversity, harm would occur through the concentration of
this access into the hands of a few, and biological harm will occur from the genetic bottlenecks
associated with such a program.
2. What specific aspects of these programs could prove problematic
or would require detailed attention?
What part would not be problematic? The costs associated with this will seriously reduce the
biodiversity accessible to the United States.
3. How could a clean stock program be designed to ensure that
quarantine pests are not inadvertently brought to the United States
along with plants for planting?
There is no way to insure that pests are not inadvertently brought in to the United States - an
asymptomatic microbe will always be a possibility.
4. Are there any foreign clean stock programs not mentioned in our
regulations that could serve as models for a general clean stock
program?
No clean stock program should be implemented. Clean stock programs should be strictly voluntary,
educational programs, not imposed programs.
We invite responses to the following questions in particular on the
best management practices program we are considering:
1. As noted above, draft codes of conduct that could form the core
of a best management practices program already exist. Are these codes a
feasible starting point from which to develop a best management
practices program?
The code mentioned in the docket as an example, the "Saint Louis Declaration, a product of the
Workshop on Linking Ecology and Horticulture to Prevent Plant Invasion held in St. Louis, Missouri,
in December 2000" is not credible - first, it was held in the Monsanto center at the Missouri
Botanic Gardens - hardly appropriate, and second, I have spoken with several participants, both from
industry and academia, who expressed concerns about the non-objective, non-neutral nature of the
proceedings; they felt that the "Declaration" was essentially a "done deal"
prepared in largely in advance and that the workshop was merely a facade to legitimize the
declaration. A number of participants in the early stages who expressed dissent with portions of the
agenda were purposely excluded from later stages. Invasion biology itself has depended on anecdote
and the suppression of contrary data to achieve its influence.
2. Do other applicable best management practices programs exist?
Which of these is the best one, and why? What additional costs might be
associated with growing plants for planting under this type of program?
What benefits might be associated with implementing such a program?
3. What existing industry practices should be incorporated into
this program?
4. What permit conditions would help to reduce the risk that
quarantine pests associated with plants for planting imported in
limited quantities for testing could become established, or that the
plants for planting themselves, if the taxon proves to be invasive,
could become established?
5. What would be the best way to identify and assess any
environmental risks that might be associated with the importation of
plants for planting under a best management practices program?
These further questions indicate that the Department is already committed to such programs. What
evidence does the Department have that such a system is the best way to reduce risk? What evidence
does the Department have that such programs would not prove an unnecessary burden and hindrance of
the strategically-important free flow of living plant materials which is necessary for maintaining
our national security? What evidence does the Department have that this will not merely further the
centralization, bottle-necking, and control of the "biological internet" into corporate
hands? Or is this the intent?
The consensus of history is that the collapse of the Soviet Union and other centrally-planned
economies was just that - primarily due to the weaknesses inherent in centralized control, and the
paralyzing effect of excessive bureaucratic controls which sought to micro-manage all aspects of
production and trade. Such a system of central planning and bureaucratic micro-management is
inherently weak. What evidence does the Department have that the system of "clean stock"
and "best practices" that is proposed will not be economically-stifling and place the
country at an even greater risk than posed by pests, by limiting the essential free flow of living
plant materials? Considering that existing systems of licensing, inspections, and cleanliness are
adequate to prevent the vast majority of movement of pest species, what evidence does the Department
have that such an expensive, intrusive, and limiting system as that proposed will provide benefits
greater than its cost, considering the microscopic percentage of pest movement that it might
prevent? What cost-benefit analysis has the Department done? It is a fundamental principle of risk
management that zero risk is impossible, and that as it is approached, costs increase exponentially
- at some point, the costs become a greater harm than the minimal remaining risk - has the
Department made an honest attempt to determine this point?
David Theodoropoulos
Box 337
La Honda, CA 94020-0337 USA